Recent Case Decisions by unknown
Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal
Volume 4 | Number 4
November 2018
Recent Case Decisions
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej
Part of the Energy and Utilities Law Commons, Natural Resources Law Commons, and the Oil,
Gas, and Mineral Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal by an authorized editor of University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. For more
information, please contact darinfox@ou.edu.
Recommended Citation


















Table of Contents 
 
SELECTED OIL AND GAS DECISIONS ......................................................... 566 
SELECTED WATER DECISIONS .................................................................. 578 
SELECTED LAND DECISIONS ..................................................................... 582 
SELECTED ELECTRICITY DECISIONS ......................................................... 586 
SELECTED ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS .................................................. 590 





All case citations are as of 11-18-2018. The citations provided in this Case 
Report do not reflect changes made by Lexis or Westlaw, or the case’s 
addition to a case reporter after that date. This Case Report contains case 
decisions issued through 9-14-2017. This PDF version of the newsletter is 
word-searchable. If you have any suggestions for improving the Newsletter, 
please e-mail the editorial staff at ou.mineral.law@gmail.com.  
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
566 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 4 
  
 
SELECTED OIL AND GAS DECISIONS 
 
Upstream – Federal  
 
4th Cir. 
Berghoff v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, No. 17-1336, 2018 WL 4044059 
(4th Cir. Aug. 24, 2018). 
 
Mineral Owners (“Owners”) executed mineral lease, which gave Company 
the right to extract oil and gas from their properties and contained a pooling 
provision. The lease required Company to notify Owner of any pooling. A 
conditional five-year secondary term followed a five-year primary term if 
the Company was still operating in the search for oil and gas at the 
expiration of the primary term. Due to a dispute regarding the location of 
the well pad, Company built the well on an adjacent plot, where it could 
still successfully pool with Owners’ parcel. Owners sought declaratory 
relief that the lease expired at the end of the primary term and sought 
compensatory damages for Company’s unauthorized extraction following 
the lease’s expiration. The court found that Company failed to comply with 
its notification requirements regarding the pooling during the primary term, 
and thus failed to extend the lease. Company mailed its notification two 
years after the pooling declaration was recorded, but, since mailing was a 
prerequisite to pooling, Company never actually completed the pooling in 
accordance with the lease. Company’s defense of the doctrine of substantial 
performance failed, as Owners did not prevent Company from complying 
with the pooling provision; in such cases the doctrine of substantial 
performance would have been successful only if misconduct by lessor had 
prevented lessee from fulfilling its duties. By failing to comply strictly with 
the terms of the lease, Company failed to extend the lease.  
 
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules 




Matthews v. Ankor Energy, LLC, No. 17-0062-CG-B, 2018 WL 3832851 
(S.D. Ala. Aug. 13, 2018). 
 
Landowner alleged Company committed waste and breached implied 
covenants contained in oil and gas leases issued by Landowner. This matter 
comes from the Report and Recommendation of the magistrate judge 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol4/iss4/6
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pertaining to the case. The magistrate judge concluded that Defendants’ 
motions to dismiss the case should only be granted as to their contention 
“that count five should be dismissed because no statutory claim for waste 
exists under Ala. Code § 9-17-19.” The magistrate judge concluded that the 
motions to dismiss should be denied as to Defendants’ other bases. 
Landowner moved for reconsideration of the dismissal of Count Five 
concerning the statutory claim for waste and Company moved for review of 
the dismissal of the motion to dismiss on all other grounds. The court 
concurred with the conclusions of the magistrate judge as to the dismissal 
of Company’s motion to dismiss, finding: (1) it was not necessary to invoke 
primary jurisdiction to the State Oil and Gas Board of Alabama; (2) 
Landowners had exhausted their administrative remedies; (3) Landowners’ 
complaint was not an improper collateral attack on the Board’s Orders; (4) 
Landowners’ complaint was not barred by res judicata; (5) Landowner did 
not fail to comply with the notice requirements in the lease; (6) Landowner 
may be able to maintain tort claims because they may arise from duties 
created by the leases, and it would be inappropriate to dismiss tort claims at 
this time; (7) Company had not shown orders that supersede the contractual 
terms; and (8) Company  could not show Landowner could not recover for 
punitive damages. As to Landowner’s request for consideration, the court 
found that the Alabama statute did provide a private right of action for 
waste, and Count Five of the motion to dismiss should have been denied. 
Thus, Company’s motion to dismiss was denied in its entirety.  
 
D. Idaho 
Citizens Allied for Integrity & Accountability, Inc. v. Schultz, No. 1:17-cv-
00264-BLW, 2018 WL 3848397 (D. Idaho Aug. 13, 2018). 
 
Mineral interest owners (“Owners”) brought action against the Idaho 
Department of Lands (“IDL”) and the Idaho Oil and Gas Conservation 
Committee (“IOGCC”) for violation of their due process rights, alleging 
that IDL and IOGCC violated their rights by failing to provide meaningful 
opportunity to oppose an integration application filed by an oil and gas 
operator (“Operator”) seeking to develop a pool of natural gas.  Following 
the issuance of the Final Order by the IOGCC approving the integration 
application, Owners filed a complaint challenging the Final Order under 42 
U.S.C §1983, which provides a remedy for the violation of constitutional 
rights. Owners sought summary judgement on all claims except as to 
financial damages, and IDL and IOGCC sought summary judgement as to 
all of Owners’ claims. To establish a due process violation, Owner must 
show a protected property interest and a deprivation of the property without 
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receiving the process that is constitutionally due. The court found that a due 
process violation occurred to the extent that Owners’ motion for partial 
summary judgment was granted and the cross motion was denied in part. 
Specifically, Owner had a protected property interest; because the Idaho 
legislature had decided “that for landowners with the property overlying a 
pool of hydrocarbons, that ‘bundle’ consisted not only of a royalty and 
bonus payment, but also just and reasonable terms.” See Idaho Code § 47-
320. As to deprivation of property, the court held Owners were provided an 
opportunity to present their objections in a hearing, and the hearing officer 
provided a reason for the decision that was made. “However, the lack of 
any explanation as to what would guide the decision of whether the terms 
of the integration order were just and reasonable meant that Plaintiffs' 
opportunity to be heard was not ‘meaningful,’ as required to satisfy due 
process.” 
 
Upstream – State  
 
Alaska 
State Dep't of Nat. Res. v. Alaskan Crude Corp., No. S-16308/16407, 2018 
WL 4170932 (Alaska Aug. 31, 2018).  
Lessee attempted to extend the term of an oil and gas lease by conducting 
drilling activities on the last day of the lease. However, in contravention of 
the terms of the lease, the Alaska State Department of Natural Resources 
(“Department”) informed Lessee two days later that the lease had expired. 
Department cured its error by reinstating the lease. Lessee contended that 
the Department added unsavory terms in the reinstatement and sought legal 
remedy. Department terminated the lease six months later, citing Lessee’s 
failure to adequately pursue development. The Supreme Court of Alaska 
concluded that Department materially breached the lease by failing to 
extend it upon lessee’s continued development, however, Department cured 
that breach when it reinstated the lease. The Court overturned the lower 
court’s reinstatement of the lease that Department terminated due to a lack 
of development. The Court reasoned that while there was a limited time for 
Lessee to resume drilling operations, Lessee had chosen to litigate the lease 
issues rather than continue developing the resources. The Court agreed with 
the Commissioner’s assessment that litigation activities are not “drilling 
activities” as required by the lease for retention of drilling rights. 
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules 
should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol4/iss4/6





Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Dep’t of Conservation, 236 Cal.Rptr.3d 729 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2018). 
  
Environmental organization (“Organization”) sought mandamus against 
Department, requiring immediate closure of oil and gas wells that were 
injecting and polluting underground aquifers, violating the Safe Drinking 
Water Act (“SDWA”). SDWA protects potential sources of drinking water, 
including underground aquifers. One way SDWA provides this protection is 
through required, statewide programs that control underground injection. 
Injections may be permitted within the state plan. Mandamus compels an 
agency to perform a ministerial act that corrects past actions or abuses of 
discretion; however, mandamus cannot compel an agency to perform a 
ministerial action in a specific way. For an act to be ministerial, it must be 
required and its processes governed by a legal authority. EPA and 
Department, pursuant to SDWA, administered the State’s program that 
controlled underground injection, the cause of the aquifer pollution. Later, 
Department did not comply with the plan. Upon receipt of a letter from 
EPA, Department implemented a corrective action plan, which was 
essentially a nonsubstantial revision of the original plan. The corrective 
plan allowed limited injection into aquifers that could potentially be a 
source of drinking water, but only until February of 2017; however, 
injections continued after that date. Certain permitted oil and gas wells were 
injecting into potential underground drinking sources. Given these 
extraordinary circumstances with permit discrepancies, Department and 
EPA conducted an interest balancing test and chose to continue the 
injections. Under SDWA, Department had the duty to protect aquifers and 
not endanger potential drinking sources, but Department retained its 
discretion in how best to carry out that task. The Court held that SDWA did 




LCL, LLC, v. Fallen, 390 P.3d 571 (Kan. Ct. App. 2017).  
  
Company filed a lawsuit seeking to quiet title to its one-half interest in 
mineral rights. Owners filed a counterclaim also seeking to quiet title. 
Owners and Company settled quiet title, but Owners filed a lawsuit against 
Third Party for negligence, breach of implied contract, and breach of 
fiduciary duty. Third Party sought summary judgment based on statute of 
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limitations. On the claim of negligence, which alleged that Third Party 
negligently filed and recorded sale of property by not excluding the interest 
in mineral rights in the sale, the court found that the Owners did not suffer 
substantial injury until they stopped receiving royalty payments due to 
them. Because the loss of royalty payments did not begin until 2014, 
Owners were not barred by the statute of limitations and had an actionable 
injury for a negligence claim. Breach of implied contract was definitively 
barred by the statute of limitations. The court found that the claim for the 
breach of fiduciary duty was not barred by the statute of limitations, 
because it did not rise until 2014 when Owner stopped receiving royalty 
payments. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with the court’s ruling.  
 
Ohio 
Am. Energy-Utica, LLC v. Fuller, No. 17 CA 000028, 2018 WL 3868119, 
2018-Ohio-3250. 
Gas Company asserted that the Maryland Public Service Commission 
(“Commission”), the circuit court for Montgomery County, and the court of 
special appeals erred in their statutory analyses related to distribution 
pipeline projects. Commission regulates public service companies, 
including Gas Company. Commission may order an adjustment of a public 
service company’s rates if the income they receive year deviates from the 
prior year. The STRIDE statute allowed the recovery of reasonable and 
prudent costs of investments so long as Commission approves the 
investments. Gas Company filed a STRIDE plan to recover costs for 
investing in the pipeline system. However, the lower courts did not agree 
that Gas Company should recover for the investments in pipeline that are 
not located in the state of Maryland because the STRIDE statute only 
applies to in-state projects. The court found the plain language of the statute 
to be unambiguous in providing that costs can be recovered for projects 
located in the state of Maryland. According to the court, to disregard the 
clear language would violate the basic principles of statutory interpretation. 
Moreover, the legislative intent, although not required, aids in determining 
that the recovery costs only apply to projects in the state of Maryland. 
Looking at the documents of the bill, the court determined the sole focus 
was on projects within the state of Maryland.  
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Am. Water Mgmt. Serv., LLC v. Div. of Oil & Gas Res. Mgmt., No. 17AP-
145, 2018 WL 3640989, 2018-Ohio-3028.  
 
Company appealed orders from Agency requiring Company to shut in 
injection wells. The orders were issued due to alleged induced seismicity 
from the use of the wells. The Court of Common Pleas found the Agency’s 
decision unreasonable because there had been a reasonable plan submitted 
for the reinstatement of wells that had not been considered. The Agency 
then appealed the Court of Common Pleas’ decision to the Court of 
Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Agency while 
holding that the trial court lacked authority to issue an order requiring 
Agency to perform certain duties. The court reasoned that under the Ohio 
Constitution and statute, the Court of Common Pleas could take any action 
that the Agency could and that some of their holdings could not have 




Allen Drilling Acquisition Co. v. Crimson Expl. Inc., No. 10-15-00277-CV, 
2018 WL 3944676 (Tex. App. Aug. 15, 2018).  
 
Oil Company 1 (“Company 1”) brought action against Oil Company 2 
(“Company 2”) alleging breach of an agreement related to development of 
oil and gas interests in two counties. Company 2 brought a counterclaim for 
breach of the same agreement. Trial court entered judgment for Company 1 
and Company 2 appealed. The appeal involved the interpretation of a series 
of agreements relating to the interests. The appellate court made the 
following findings that resulted in the court affirming in part and reversing 
in part the decision of the trial court who erred in its interpretations of the 
agreements. First, initial agreements were not superseded by subsequent 
agreements, because “even if subsequent agreements contained a merger 
clause, the merger clause does not supersede the initial joint operating 
agreement.” Second, the Original Joint Operating Agreement (“Original 
JOA”) was not limited to the original formation but could include 
subsequent formations, because if the parties desired to impose a depth 
restriction on the properties acquired under the Area of Mutual Interest 
(“AMI”), they could do so and should have used explicit language that 
specifically limited the JOA and the AMI to the original formation. Third, 
Company 2’s breach of contract counterclaim relating to leases Company 1 
excluded Company 2 from are barred by the statute of limitations.  Fourth, 
“the trial court erred in dismissing Company 2’s breach of contract claim 
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relating to participation in subsequent leases under the Original JOA AMI.” 
The error was the result of the interpretation of the scope of the agreements 
and the strength of one agreement against another. Lastly, “Company 2 is in 
default under the [second] JOA, and Company 1 is entitled to exercise its 
remedies of suspension and foreclosure under the [second] JOA, though 
there is a fact issue remaining as to the amount of the default.” 
 
Yowell v. Granite Operating Co., No. 07-17-00112-CV, 2018 WL 3596744 
(Tex. App. July 26, 2018).  
 
The trial court found that an “anti-washout” clause within a mineral 
assignment did not extend to new leases. Successors in interest appealed. 
The “anti-washout” clause was drafted to ensure that an overriding royalty 
interest, benefiting Successors, survived if the original lease was altered or 
expired. When the original lease expired, Operator’s top lease became 
effective. Operator refused to pay on Successor’s overriding interest, and 
Successor brought suit. The trial court found that the “anti-washout” clause 
did not extend to the new top lease, Successor appealed, and the Court of 
Appeals of Texas, Amarillo affirmed. The court interpreted the clause, 
ruling that the extension of the interest would only trigger if there was a 
renewal or extension of the original lease, or if a new lease was executed on 
the same minerals. The court ruled that a top lease was not an extension or 
renewal of the original lease, but was a new lease altogether. The court then 
analyzed whether or not an “anti-washout” clause could attach to a new 
lease. The court found that the clause violated the Rule Against 
Perpetuities. In Texas, “no interest is valid unless it must vest, if at all, 
within twenty-one years after the death of some life or lives in being at the 
time of conveyance.” Two parts of the clause contained contingencies of 
indefinite nature. First, the triggering of the clause was determinate on the 
expiration of the original lease. The original lease was to survive for as long 
as the minerals produced in economic quantities—in theory, the minerals 
could have produced for an infinite amount of time. Second, the “anti-
washout” clause would attach the overriding royalty interest to any new 
lease covering the minerals in question. A new lease could have been 
executed over the minerals an indefinite amount of time after the expiration 
of the original lease. The court found that these two contingencies of 
indefinite nature violated the Rule Against Perpetuities and that the creation 
of an overriding royalty interest in the new lease was invalid. The court also 
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Midstream – Federal 
 
3d Cir.  
Twp. of Bordentown v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 903 F.3d 234 (3d 
Cir. 2018). 
 
Township brought suit against FERC to combat the expansion of interstate 
natural gas pipeline facilities operated by Pipe Line Company 
(“Company”). Township claimed FERC arbitrarily and capriciously 
approved Company’s project, violating several federal statutes governing 
approval and construction of such pipelines and other federal environmental 
protection laws. Township also alleged State Department of Environmental 
Protection (“Department”) violated state law by improperly issuing permits 
and denying Township a hearing to challenge their issuance. Township 
claims that FERC knowingly issued a certificate for Company to conduct 
activity before obtaining the state permit, which Company was required to 
obtain first under the Clean Water Act (“CWA”). Because FERC issued the 
certificate on the condition that Company obtain the necessary state permit 
before engaging in construction, there was no violation of the CWA. 
Township claimed FERC was required to exert jurisdiction over the 
pipeline project or that absent jurisdiction, FERC must perform a 
cumulative analysis on the environmental impact of the project. The Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that FERC properly addressed the potential 
impacts and FERC’s determination that it did not have jurisdiction was 
correct. Township also claimed FERCA violated NEPA with its treatment 
regarding the well impacts. However, the court disagreed. Township also 
challenged the need for the project and whether there was good faith notice, 
both lines of which the court rejected. None of Township’s numerous 
challenges to FERC’s approval survived. The Third Circuit did determine 
that Department misinterpreted the state regulation governing the hearing to 
challenge the permits and, therefore, should not have denied Township’s 
request for a permit. Department interpreted the NGA to mean that the 
federal Courts of Appeals have exclusive jurisdiction regarding any 
challenges to final decisions granting permits and the Department’s 
provisions for preliminary adjudicatory hearings were thus preempted. The 
Third Circuit remanded, requiring Department to fulfill Township’s request 
for a hearing.  
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Sierra Club, Inc. v. United States Forest Serv., 897 F.3d 582 (4th Cir. 
2018). 
 
Conservation Organization brought suit, seeking a review of decisions 
made by the Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") and the United States 
Forest Service ("USFR"). These decisions concerned a right of way granted 
to the Operator of an oil and gas pipeline through federal lands. The Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals may set aside a federal agency's action if it is 
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 
with law." In reviewing USFR's adoption of a sedimentary analysis in its 
Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS"), the court found that BLM acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously. Initially, USFR had expressed concerns over 
how Operator had overestimated the reduction of sediment its proposed 
containment measures would yield.  Despite these concerns never being 
addressed, the USFR still adopted the EIS containing the projections. 
 
Berkley v. Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, 896 F.3d 624 (4th Cir. 2018).  
 
On the route of a proposed natural gas pipeline, Landowners brought an 
action against the project and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(“FERC”), among several others. The primary basis of the suit was a 
constitutional challenge to the eminent domain provision of the Natural Gas 
Act (“NGA”) as a violation of the Fifth Amendment. FERC filed a motion 
to dismiss on the basis of the NGA’s exclusive jurisdiction provision, and 
that Congress intended to divest the district court of subject matter 
jurisdiction. The district court granted the motion without considering the 
merits of Plaintiff’s claim, and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed, citing the implicit divestment of the district court according to 
Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200 (1994).  
 
This case has been docketed for a Petition for Certiorari by Orus Ashby 
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Downstream – Federal 
 
9th Cir. 
Arandell Corp. v. Centerpoint Energy Serv., Inc., 900 F.3d 623 (9th Cir. 
2018). 
 
Consumers of natural gas brought suit against Company for its alleged 
knowledge of its parent company’s price-fixing scheme. The district court 
granted summary judgment in favor of the Company and the Consumers 
appealed. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s 
grant of summary judgment and remanded the case back to the lower court. 
The circuit court explained that it was possible, based off of Supreme Court 
precedent, for a subsidiary to be liable based off of a parent company’s 
misconduct. However, the court held, that there remained a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether or not Company knew about the price-fixing 
scheme. 
 
Downstream – State  
 
Colorado 
Bill Barrett Corp. v. Lembke, 2018 COA 134, 2018 WL 4225030.  
 
Mineral lessees (“Lessees”) appealed the trial court’s order denying motion 
for a preliminary injunction to prevent Special District (“District”) from 
taxing oil and gas produced from the mineral estate underlying an 
approximately 13,000-acre tract (“Tract”) by Lessees. On appeal, Lessees 
raised three challenges to District’s taxing authority: (1) under Colorado 
statute, the severed mineral estate underlying the 13,000-acre tract could 
not be included within District because “all the owners and lessees of that 
estate did not petition for and consent to inclusion”; (2) by including Tract 
within its boundaries to further its regional operations, District “modified 
its service plan, but did not obtain statutorily required approval from the 
board of county commissioners (“BOCC”) in each of the affected 
counties”; and (3) by including Tract within its boundaries, District violated 
Colorado statute, because its services overlapped with those of another 
district. As to the third challenge, the appellate court held that the question 
of whether services overlapped was not properly before the court. As to the 
first challenge, the appellate court found mineral estate owners to be “fee 
owners” under the statute, but owners of severed mineral estates – in this 
case, the Lessees – were not. Therefore, District did not need to show 
consent of all Lessees for inclusion in the special district, and District’s 
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taxing authority was not invalidated on that basis. The appellate court thus 
affirmed the trial court’s entry of summary judgment as to Lessees’ claim. 
As to Lessee’s second challenge, the trial court’s order denying Lessees' 
motion for a preliminary injunction was vacated based on Lessees’ “ability 
to establish a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits as to whether 
District statute by failing to obtain BOCC approval, thereby precluding 
District from being able to tax lessee.” 
 
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules 
should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.  
 
Kentucky 
Nami Res. Co., LLC v. Asher Land & Mineral, LTD., 554 S.W.3d 323 (Ky. 
2018). 
 
Lessor brought action against Lessee asserting Lessee violated its 
contractual obligations by fraudulently underpaying royalties owed under 
the leases that governed Lessee’s processing of the gas, and the market 
price for which gas was ultimately sold. Lessor’s claims were brought 
under theories of breach of contract and fraudulent misrepresentation of the 
factors that determine the amount of royalties owed to Lessor. Following a 
jury trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Lessor for over $1.3 
million in compensatory damages and over $2.6 million in punitive 
damages. Lessee appealed and Lessor promptly cross-appealed. The 
appellate court affirmed the ruling of the trial court and the case then went 
before the Supreme Court of Kentucky for discretionary review. The Court 
affirmed the award for compensatory damages, because Lessor adequately 
proved the breach of contract claim through evidence and expert testimony 
that supported a jury finding that Lessees’ royalty payments were 
unreasonable or miscalculated. While the Court affirmed the compensatory 
damages, it reversed the punitive damages. Case law in Kentucky states 
“when a plaintiff may obtain complete relief for his contractual losses by 
means of compensatory damages under a breach of contract claim, even 
when the breach is motivated by malice and accomplished through fraud, he 
may not simultaneously recover punitive damages after being made whole 
on his contractual damages.” Upon application of the foregoing, the Court 
found Lessor was made whole through its compensatory damages award for 
unpaid royalties. Additionally, the Court affirmed the appellate court’s 
rulings that: (1) post-verdict motions were timely, (2) no errors committed 
during the trial warrant a setting aside of the verdict and the granting of a 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol4/iss4/6
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new trial, and (3) the trial court properly denied Lessor’s motion to amend 
its complaint based on procedural grounds.  
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4th Cir.  
Sierra Club v. State Water Control Bd., 898 F.3d 383 (4th Cir. 2018).  
 
State certified that Project would not degrade State’s water. Environmental 
Advocates petitioned for review. The court found that State was allowed to 
regulate Project under the Clean Water Act. Such regulation must assure 
that “the activity will be conducted in a manner which will not violate 
applicable water quality standards.” State was required to consider the 
general water quality criterion and anti-degradation policy. State 
determined that Project would not permanently affect surface waters and 
would restore surface waters through State’s recommendations. The court 
found that Environmental Advocates had standing because they could trace 
injury-in-fact to the certification that State issued and that there was a 
“realistic possibility” that Environmental Advocates could be granted relief. 
The court also found that State had sufficient basis to find that water quality 
would not be adversely, permanently affected, and therefore had not acted 
arbitrarily in certifying Project. Court denied the petitions.  
 
5th Cir.  
Redburn v. City of Victoria, 898 F.3d 486 (5th Cir. 2018).  
 
Owner of property brought suit challenging a Texas City’s (“City”) use of a 
drain and sewage system consisting of an open ditch running through 
Owner’s property. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of 
City. The primary issues presented upon appeal were (1) whether City had 
acquired an easement on the property, and (2) whether the system 
constituted a physical taking under the Fifth Amendment. In regard to 
whether City had acquired an easement to the property, the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals found that substantial factual issues existed that precluded 
summary judgement on this claim. Specifically, the court found that there 
were issues as to whether the preceding owner of the property allowed the 
city to drain water through his property creating an implied easement. 
Further, issues of fact existed as to whether the preceding owner of the 
property intended to assume any risk from the storm sewer that would 
preclude Owner’s claims. Finally, the court held that Owner was aware of 
the potential damage to his property which began the statute of limitations 
for when he could file a claim and was thus time-barred by its expiration at 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol4/iss4/6
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the time of suit. As a result, the court dismissed the Fifth Amendment 
taking claim.  
 
9th Cir.  
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Zinke, 900 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 
Environmentalists challenged the findings of Fish and Wildlife Services 
(“FWS”) that did not classify the Arctic Grayling as endangered or 
threatened. Environmentalists argued that FWS used an incorrect definition 
of “range” resulting in its exclusion from the endangered or threatened 
categories. The district court held in favor of FWS on a summary judgment 
motion. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. Environmentalists 
believed that the definition of “range” should include the Grayling’s 
historical range, which Environmentalists believed would prompt its 
inclusion on endangered or threatened lists. Through a Chevron analysis, 
the Ninth Circuit determined that the word “range” in the Endangered 
Species Act was ambiguous. The Ninth Circuit then determined that the 
FWS exclusion of the Grayling was arbitrary and capricious for a variety of 
reasons including: (1) ignoring decreasing numbers; (2) failing to explain 
its belief in a cold water refuge in Big Hole River; (3) failing to consider 
the effects of climate change; and (4) conducting too short of a study to 
determine the viability of the Ruby River population. The Ninth Circuit 
therefore reversed the holding of the district court because FWS failed to 
consider the relevant factors and articulate a rational connection between 
those factors and the decision it reached. The issue was remanded to FWS 
to reconsider the listing of the Grayling in accordance with the findings. 
 
Fed. Cir.  
Crow Creek Sioux Tribe v. United States, 900 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2018).  
 
Native American Tribe (“Tribe”) filed an action against the United States 
claiming it was entitled to monetary damages and injunctive relief from the 
alleged taking of its water rights and the alleged mismanagement of Tribe’s 
water by the United States. The court found that Tribe’s water rights were 
based wholly on the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Winters v. United 
States, which stated that Indian Reservations carry implied rights to water 
“to the extent needed to accomplish the purpose of the reservation.” 207 
U.S. 564 (1908). However, the U.S. filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that 
Tribe lacked standing to sue. The Federal Circuit found that in light of 
Winters, the scope of the water rights depends on Tribe’s need for the 
water, and here, Tribe had not alleged that the amount of water flowing into 
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the reservation and available for use was insufficient for its purpose. By 
extension, the court found that Tribe had failed to allege an injury in fact 






Envtl. Law Found. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 237 Cal. Rptr. 3d 393 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2018).  
 
Foundation asked the court to determine whether the public trust doctrine 
applied to groundwater, and if so, whether the legislature replaced them 
with the 2014 Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (“SGMA”). The 
issue was whether the SGMA replaces or crystalizes “the common law duty 
to consider the public trust interests before allowing groundwater extraction 
that potentially harms a navigable waterway.”  The lower court found that 
the public trust doctrine did apply to groundwater connected to the public 
resources of the Scott River, the County had to consider the public trust 
when giving permits for groundwater wells, and County’s common law 
public trust duties didn’t conflict with the SGMA. County appealed whether 
Board actually had a duty and authority to regulate groundwater extraction, 
and whether such a duty under the public trust doctrine even existed. The 
court rejected County’s claim that the public trust doctrine should not apply 
to non-navigable groundwater, because groundwater extraction that 
negatively affects the public trust waters of the Scott River is, indirectly, 
part of the public trust. The court also rejected the idea that the reasonable 
use doctrine overrides the public trust doctrine, because the Supreme Court 
held in a previous case that different standards can exist simultaneously. 
The court also held that Board had the authority to “protect the public trust” 
and not be limited by the confines of the Board’s license and permit 
authority. The court rejected County’s assertion that the SGMA occupied 
the field of law and supplanted the public trust, because the SGMA did not 
completely cover the issues of groundwater in its terms. The court held that 
there was no violation of the separation of powers, because there was no 
apparent legislative intent to supersede the public trust doctrine in the 








Puget Soundkeeper All. v. State, 424 P.3d 1173 (Wash. 2018). 
 
Alliance challenged Ecology’s issuance of a permit to a company for 
discharging waste water on an issue with the testing practice required by the 
permit. Alliance challenged the amount of PCB allowed and wanted 
Ecology to use the more sensitive test 1668C to check for compliance on 
the limits of polychlorinated biphenyls (“PCB”) in the waste water, as 
opposed to Ecology’s Method 608 test. The Pollution Control Hearings 
Board ruled that Ecology could ask the EPA to approve use of rule 1668C 
but did not have to, because Method 608 was the only test presently 
approved by the EPA. Alliance appealed and the court of appeals affirmed 
the Board’s ruling. Alliance appealed again to the Supreme Court of 
Washington, claiming that the testing under regulation WAC 173-201A-
260(3)(h), Method 608, was insufficient to test for PBC water quality 
standards required under statute RCW 90.48.520, thus requiring use of 
Method 1668C. Review of the Board’s decision was carried out de novo. 
The Court rejected the arguments of Alliance, because the Court held that 
the EPA standard only required a “sufficiently sensitive” test for water 
discharge permits and Method 608 was such a “sufficiently sensitive” test. 
The relevant statute required a test to be known, available, and reliable. The 
Court held that Method 1668C was an unreliable test, because it could not 
determine the source of PBCs and was not EPA approved. The only other 
way for Method 1668C to be used was if it was a superseding test, which 
the Court held that it was not, because the EPA published Method 1668C to 
be used in conjunction with other water quality tests. The Court held that a 
supplementary test cannot usurp a normal test, like Method 608. The Court 
held for Ecology and affirmed the Board and appellate court decisions.  
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Geysers Dev. P’ship v. Geysers Power Co., LLC, No. 17-cv-06834-WHO, 
2018 WL 3730129 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2018).  
 
Developer brought action to enforce and clarify an easement within the 
largest geothermal energy field in the world. Developer owns the property, 
while Power Company holds a 99-year lease to develop and extract steam 
to generate electricity. Both parties filed for summary judgment to resolve 
whether the easement is unfettered access or merely purposes related to 
electrical generation and maintenance, particularly what rights Partnership 
retained and what rights Power Company held. The court granted 
Partnership’s motion and denied Power Company’s, holding that 
Partnership may restrict third party access to the site and prevent the use of 
facilities on the property from being used to process steam generated off-
site.  
 
This case has since been appealed to the Ninth Circuit, but there is no 





City of Hartford v. CBV Parking Hartford, LLC, 192 A.3d 406 (Conn. 
2018). 
 
City, in an attempt to beautify its downtown area, used eminent domain to 
purchase several pieces of property being used as parking lots. Owner of 
the property sued the city and claimed the property had been improperly 
valued, citing the increased utility of the land as a result of the development 
of a minor league baseball stadium adjacent to the lots. The lower court 
increased the value of the property by approximately $3 million with an 
interest rate of 7.22 percent. City appealed, contending that the lower court 
improperly valued the property and exceeded its authority in awarding 
interest. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the valuation but 
overturned the award of interest. The Court dismissed City’s argument that 
the lower court used the wrong test for valuation. The Court found that the 
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lower court was reasonable in its valuation of the property on the belief that 
City would combine the lots with others to be used in its upscale 
development of the neighborhood. The Court found, however, that the 
lower court exceeded its authority in awarding an interest rate of 7.22 
percent. Connecticut statute demands the method of calculating interest in 
eminent domain suits as the “weekly average one-year constant maturity 
yield of United States Treasury securities . . . for the calendar week 
preceding the date of taking.” Thus, the Court affirmed the valuation of the 
property but remanded the issue of interest to be decided in line with 
statutory guidelines.  
 
Kentucky 
C.W. Hoskins Heirs v. Wells, 2017-SC-000004-DG, 2018 WL 3914711 
(Ky. Aug. 16, 2018). 
  
Owner brought suit against Lessee, alleging that Lessee did not pay coal 
royalties. Lessee brought adjacent landowners (“Adjacent”) into the action 
to determine whose land the coal was on. Owner and Adjacent had the 
burden to establish the location of the boundary line between their lands. 
The lower court used Owner’s survey to determine the boundary line rather 
than Adjacent’s because Adjacent’s surveyor did not consider surrounding 
deeds, which is a violation of a surveyor’s standards of practice. Finding in 
favor of Owner’s property line, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that 
Owner was entitled to Lessee’s coal royalties. 
 
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules 
should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.  
 
New Jersey 
Seaside Heights Borough Pub. Beach v. Seaside Heights Borough & 
AFMV, Inc., Nos. A-4585-15T3, A-5372-15T3, A-0557-16T4, 2018 WL 
3614590 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 30, 2018). 
 
Three Parties appealed decisions made by the New Jersey Department of 
Environmental Protection (“DEP”). The DEP decisions approved plans to 
convey a beach parcel to a pier owner in exchange for other parcels of 
property. Parties argued that the DEP did not have the authority to approve 
the conveyance under state statute. The Superiors State Court affirmed the 
decisions of the DEP. The court explained that the replacement land in the 
conveyance was “reasonably equivalent” as a whole, the fair market value 
of the replacement land exceeded that of the beach parcel, and the required 
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replacement ratio of 1:4 was far exceeded. The court further held that 
certain policy decisions had been appropriately made by the DEP in 
consideration of the transaction.  
 
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules 
should be consulted before citing the case as precedent. 
 
Oregon 
Cascadia Wildlands v. Oregon Dep’t of State Lands, 427 P.3d 1091 (Or. Ct. 
App. 2018). 
 
Environmental Group filed suit challenging the sale of a parcel of land by 
the Oregon Department of State Lands (“ODSL”) to Timber Company. 
Previously, the trial court held that Environmental Group lacked standing to 
sue and dismissed the claim without reaching the merits of the case. 
However, on appeal, the court found that under Oregon law, standing is 
based on a statutory source, in this case ORS 183.480, which allows anyone 
with aggrieved interest to have standing. In this case, one of the members of 
the Environmental Group alleged that he was no longer able to enjoy the 
forest and was thus aggrieved. The court agreed, and thereby determined 
that since a member of Environmental Group was aggrieved, they had 
standing. Given that Environmental Group had standing, and that the record 
was fully developed, it proceeded to the merits of the case. Environmental 
Group posited that the sale of the parcel was prohibited by ORS 530.450. 
ODSL did not contest that the sale was prohibited but chose to argue that 
the statute itself was unconstitutional under the Oregon Constitution. 
However, the court found that the plain text of the statute was intended to 
prevent this exact situation and that it was constitutional. As a result, the 
case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings.  
 
Washington 
Maytown Sand & Gravel, LLC v. Thurston Cty., 423 P.3d 223 (Wash. 
2018).  
 
Company sued County for interference, negligent misrepresentation and a § 
1983 due process violation. Company received the property and permit to 
mine from a prior occupant of the property and faced several challenges 
from environmental groups over its mining operation. Company agreed to 
mine a significantly reduced amount and reclaim the property after 
obtaining the reduced amount. Under pressure from concerned groups, 
County insisted upon additional environmental testing not stipulated by the 
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State, and Company complied. After completing the testing, County 
insisted upon adjusting the permit formally and hold a hearing before 
mining would start. The Washington Supreme Court held that there was 
sufficient evidence to uphold the § 1983 action, that Company’s property 
rights were violated, that there was tortious interference, and that Company 
was not entitled to attorney’s fees.  
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SELECTED ELECTRICITY DECISIONS 
Traditional Generation 
 
9th Cir.  
Turlock Irrigation Dist. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 903 F.3d 862 
(9th Cir. 2018). 
 
 
California Districts (“Districts”) challenged FERC’s decision denying their 
complaint against Gas and Electric Company (“Company”) for breach of 
agreement. The California Department of Water Resources (“Department”) 
entered into a contract with Company for Company to provide Department 
with various services. Company then entered into an Interconnection 
Agreement (“Agreement”) with Others, providing the terms of the 
operations. Department had such large power needs, so it participated in a 
Remedial Action Scheme (“RAS”) to manage the system. Before the 
contract was set to terminate, Department notified Company it would cease 
the RAS. Districts approached the State and Company regarding potential 
Adverse Impact of the loss of the RAS on their systems. Company 
disagreed with Districts’ concerns, so Districts filed a complaint against 
Company. FERC decided a reprogramming of the RAS “was not likely” to 
have an Adverse Impact on the Districts’ Systems. Districts appealed. The 
issue depended on the interpretation of “Adverse Impact” in the Agreement. 
FERC concluded that “Adverse Impact” only applied to material 
degradation of a system’s reliability, but did not consider the second 
alternate definition, which applies to reductions in import capabilities. 
Because FERC too narrowly interpreted the meaning of Adverse Impact, 
FERC’s orders were arbitrary and capricious. The court also found that 
FERC used an incorrect standard in evaluating Districts’ request under the 
Agreement for a study on the impact of the RAS reprogramming. The court 
remanded for further proceedings, ordering FERC to use the broader 
definition of Adverse Impact and the proper standard for requesting a study 
on whether Company breached the Agreement by reprogramming the RAS 
and reducing the import capabilities of Districts’ Systems. 
 
Massachusetts 
New England Power Generators Ass’n v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 105 N.E.3d 
1156 (Mass. 2018). 
 
Energy Companies (“Companies”) assert that State overstepped its 
authority with an Act that (1) imposes decreasing greenhouse gas emission 
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limits on State’s electric sector, (2) will actually increase Statewide 
emissions, and (3) contains a sunset provision prohibiting regulations after 
2020. The Act has two relevant provisions regarding the allegation that 
State exceeded its authority. The first, § 3(c), allows the executive office 
and department to control emissions of the electric sector. The second, § 
3(d), generally allows for regulations to establish a declining level of 
aggregate emissions for all sources. Companies argue that the existence of 
the § 3(c) targeted provision exempts the electric sector from § 3(d). The 
court determined that the two provisions are complements, and the electric 
sector is not exempt from regulations created under § 3(d)’s authority. 
Therefore, State has the authority to create regulations under § 3(d) that 
establish emission caps on the energy industry. The Court determined that 
the regulatory scheme for emission reduction includes provisions that 
would counter the possibility of outsourcing electricity, resulting in an 
increase of emissions outside of the state. Most significantly, the 
regulations require electricity providers to obtain increasing amounts of 
clean-energy-sourced electricity each year. Lastly, the Court did not 
interpret the sunset provision, which required regulations to expire at the 
end of 2020, to mean the entire State’s authority of the statute also expired. 
The Court interpreted the text in light of the entire regulatory scheme and 
determined just the current provisions would expire, but State would still 
have the authority to create new regulations under § 3(d). 
 
Vermont 
In re Green Mountain Power Corp., 2018 VT 97, 2018 WL 4266393. 
 
Renewable Energy Company (“Company-1”) appealed the Vermont Public 
Utility Commission’s (“PUC”) denial to intervene as a party in proceedings 
concerning whether Power Company (“Company-2”) could purchase power 
generation facilities from outside the state. PUC granted several certificates 
of public goods (“CPGs”) to Company-2, allowing it to purchase out-of-
state power facilities. Company-1 sought intervention, claiming it had a 
right to do so as (1) it has a substantial interest which might be adversely 
affected, (2) there are no alternative proceedings to protect that interest, and 
(3) its interests are not already adequately represented. PUC denied 
Company-1’s motion to intervene for lack of a “substantial, particularized 
interest,” as Company-1 had no interest that separated itself from any other 
ratepayer that might be affected from a change in electricity rates as a result 
of the CPGs. While the PUC’s rule does not explicitly require a 
“particularized” interest, the Court must give enormous consideration to the 
PUC’s application of its own rules. Thus, the Court deferred to the PUC’s 
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interpretation. Company-1 also had no substantial interest from its status as 
a competitor that would require the PUC to join Company-1 to the CPG 
proceedings. The Court determined that, absent any substantial interest, the 
PUC properly denied Company-1’s motion to intervene. The Court also 




Fed. Cir.  
Alta Wind I Owner Lessor C v. United States, 897 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 
2018). 
 
This dispute between Government and Windfarm Owners (“Owners”) 
centered around the proper method of calculating cash grants for certain 
renewable energy facilities under the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act. Owners used the “unallocated method” of calculation, which 
calculated the allocable amount as the difference between the purchase 
price and grant-ineligible tangible property. The Government contended the 
“residual method” of § 1060 of the Internal Revenue Code was proper: the 
purchase price less the grant-ineligible tangible property must then be 
allocated between grant-eligible tangible personal property and grant-
ineligible intangibles. Owners argued that intangibles, such as goodwill, 
could not exist as the facilities were not operational when Owners 
purchased them. The court determined that the residual method was proper, 
as the purchases constituted an “active trade or business. . . to which 
goodwill or going concern value could. . . attach.” The mere possibility of 
the existence of goodwill and other intangible assets required the use of the 
residual method. The court relied on the existence of transmission rights, 
the possibility of goodwill accruing through contracts, and customer 




D.C. Cir.  
Util. Workers Union of Am. Local 464 v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 
896 F.3d 573 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
 
Union brought suit against Agency after the closure of a coal-fired 
electrical plant. The closure was announced immediately before the annual 
forward capacity auction (“FCA”), without enough time for other large 
electricity suppliers to supplant the deficit caused by the closure, and Union 
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argued this resulted in a spike in the auction price to the detriment of 
electricity customers. Union attempted to challenge the closure through 
Commission, but the FCA auction went into effect before Commission 
ruled. Union brought essentially the same suit in the subsequent two FCAs, 
continuing the same argument that the closure manipulated market prices to 
an unfairly high rate. Agency submitted a motion for summary judgment on 
direct review, which was granted. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that Union could not prove proximate causation between the closure of the 
plant and the harm in the subsequent years, and that any injury caused in 
the year of the closure lacked an appropriate remedy.  
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SELECTED ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS 
Federal 
 
2d Cir.  
Cooling Water Intake Structure Coal. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 905 F.3d 49 
(2d Cir. 2018). 
 
Suit consolidating four petitions: (1) challenging a Final Rule concerning 
entrainment and impingement requirements for cooling water intake 
structures under § 316(b) of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) as arbitrary and 
capricious and in conflict with provisions of the Endangered Species Act 
(“ESA”); (2) challenging the same Final Rule as going beyond the authority 
given to the EPA under the CWA, that Final Rule’s primary supporting 
biological opinion was erroneous, and that the EPA did not engage in 
sufficient notice and comment under the APA; (3) challenging the Final 
Rule as insufficient under APA notice and comment requirements by 
defining “new units” of cooling water intake structures so vaguely as to not 
provide actual notice; (4) arguing that EPA’s Final Rule was arbitrary and 
capricious by applying these standards to intake structures that do not draw 
water for the purpose of cooling. The Second Circuit concluded that in 
relation to the first and second petition, the Final Rule was sufficiently 
supported by the evidence and within the CWA and ESA. In the case of the 
third petition, the court stated the EPA rationally narrowed the Final Rule 
after notice and comment, which they are encouraged to do. The court also 
rejected the final petition as baseless.  
 
4th Cir. 
Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 899 F.3d 260 (4th Cir. 2018). 
 
Organization challenged Department’s decisions pertaining to the approval 
of the Atlantic Coast Pipeline pursuant to the Endangered Species Act and 
the Mineral Leasing Act. The Organization, specifically, challenged the 
authorization of an incidental take statement which allowed for the kill or 
harm of five species on the endangered or threatened list, and the decision 
to allow a right of way through the Blue Ridge Parkway. The Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals concluded that the Department’s decisions were arbitrary 
and capricious, and vacated the Department’s decisions. The court reasoned 
that the decision granting the right of way lacked an explanation 
demonstrating the pipeline’s consistency with the purposes of the Parkway, 
as required under the Blue Ridge Parkway Organic Act, and that the 
incidental take statement set vague and unenforceable limits.  
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Sierra Club v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 903 F.3d 403 (4th Cir. 2018). 
 
Group brought action against Company, alleging Company’s liability for 
introducing arsenic pollution from ash storage in settling ponds. The action 
commenced years after Company had first become aware of high pollutant 
levels and entered into a corrective action plan with Agency, a state entity. 
Group alleged that Company was in violation of the Clean Waters Act 
(“CWA”) by allowing pollution from “point sources,” as well as two 
conditions of discharge permits Company obtained as part of its corrective 
action plan with Agency. The lower court found Company in violation of 
the CWA but deferred to the Agency’s understanding that Company had 
not violated the discharge permits. Both parties appealed, and the appellate 
court held for Company in both respects. The court noted that a CWA 
violation turned on the definition of “point source,” as the CWA was 
strictly limited to pollutants discharging from such sources, and that other 
environmental protection laws, such as the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (“RCRA”), contemplated restrictions on other sources of 
pollution. The appellate court noted that the term “conveyance” was 
essential to understanding a point source, and that the carefully defined 
terms of the CWA constrained its applicability. Under that understanding, 
settling ponds were not point sources, as they allow diffuse seepage and 
therefore distribution but do not convey a pollutant as a pipe or channel 
would. The distinction removed Company’s settling ponds from CWA 
liability. The court noted that RCRA still applied to Company’s obligations, 
and therefore Company was still directed to manage the pollutants. 
However, the discharge permits at question were obtained from Agency in 
compliance with RCRA. Therefore, Company remained responsible for 
pollutants, Agency’s determination that the discharge permits were not to 
be understood via a CWA analysis was appropriate, and Company was not 
in violation of the CWA. 
 
9th Cir.  
Bohmker v. Oregon, 903 F.3d 1029 (9th Cir. 2018). 
State passed a law that placed a temporary moratorium on in-stream 
mining, in an effort to protect indigenous fish species and improve their 
habitat. Miners with claims on federal lands challenged the law on 
preemption grounds three months before it went into effect. The lower court 
granted State’s motion for summary judgment finding that the regulation 
was reasonable and not preempted. State then repealed and replaced the 
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temporary moratorium with a permanent ban in areas deemed essential 
salmon habitat. Miners appealed. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
surveyed federal law on the issue of mining on federal lands determining 
that while the federal government intended to encourage mining and 
stewardship of the minerals it did not intend to do so at the expense of the 
environment and wildlife. The court determined that State’s legislation was 
not preempted by the theory of field preemption nor was it by conflict 
preemption. The court affirmed the judgment of the lower court. Judge 
Smith delivered a passionate dissent saying that he would reverse the lower 
court’s decision either on the theory of field preemption or under his belief 
that State’s restriction is so severe that it is de facto land use plan. 
Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 905 F.3d 565 (9th Cir. 2018).   
 
Tribes brought a CERCLA action against State and Company for the 
dumping of waste into the Columbia River. After the trial court entered 
judgment in favor of Tribes, Company appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals. On appeal, Company asserted it had provided a sufficient 
defense of divisibility. The court noted that CERCLA liability is usually 
joint and several, but on rare occasions can be apportioned if the damage is 
shown to be divisible. The divisibility analysis involves two steps. First, the 
court determined whether or not the environmental damages could be 
theoretically apportioned.  Then the court determined if the record provided 
a "reasonable basis" to apportion liability. At both steps, the party asserting 
the defense bears the burden a proof. It is a high burden to meet and 
intensely factual, but a preponderance of the evidence standard applies.  
Company's expert conducted a study focusing only on the pollutants 
Company had released into the river. The study did not consider what other 
pollutants were already in the river. The court determined that due to the 
study overlooking the possible environmental damages resulting from the 
aggregation of toxic chemicals, Company had not met its burden to show 
that the damage could have been theoretically apportioned. The court also 
found that Company had not met its burden to show that there was a 
rational basis for apportionment. Company's methods for apportioning 
liability were all volumetric in nature. The court held that volumetric 
apportionment methods are only useful when it can be reasonably assumed 
that independent factors made no significant effect on the scope of 
environmental harm. The court found that a reasonable person would have 
to consider geographic and temporal factors when determining the 
environmental impact of pollution. The court affirmed the judgment against 
Company.   
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10th Cir.  
Chance v. Zinke, 898 F.3d 1025 (10th Cir. 2018). 
 
Landowner sued the government for violation of the National 
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”). Landowner claimed that the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) violated NEPA by granting permits to drill new 
wells without conducting required environmental-impact assessments 
before approving the drilling permits. The district court dismissed 
Landowner’s claim against the government for lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded to 
have the claim dismissed for failure to state a claim. The court explained 
that Landowner’s claims were untimely due to the expiration of the 
applicable statute of limitations and, thus, dismissal for failure to state a 
claim was appropriate.   
 
D.C. Cir.  
Boston Delegation v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 897 F.3d 241 (D.C. 
Cir. 2018). 
 
FERC approved a pipeline operator’s (“Operator”) request to upgrade its 
pipeline to increase its capacity. Concerned Citizens (“CC”) alleged that 
FERC failed to consider safety issues when issuing its permit to Operator. 
CC argued that FERC failed to comply with NEPA because it improperly 
segmented the project when performing its environmental review and did 
not give enough weight to the cumulative environmental impacts of the 
pipeline upgrade. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held the segmentation 
was proper because of the functional and timing uniqueness of the projects 
and FERC did not fail to comply with NEPA. Additionally, the D.C. Circuit 
held that no violation of NEPA occurred because FERC did adequately 
consider the cumulative environmental impacts based on the information 
available to the agency at the time of its determination. CC argued that 
FERC’s determination that the pipeline upgraded created no additional 
safety risk lacked substantial evidence. The D.C. Circuit found FERC’s 
determination of no increased safety risk to be supported by substantial 
evidence because it properly relied on expert opinion and denied CC 
argument. CC finally alleged that the third-party contractor used to 
formulate FERC’s environmental impact study had a conflict of interest. 
The Court held that despite CC being able to show a conflict of interest, 
that the conflict would only invalidate if it destroyed the NEPA process, 
which CC could not show. D.C. Circuit denied the petitions under review. 
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Util. Solid Waste Activities Grp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 901 F.3d 414 (D.C. 
Cir. 2018). 
 
EPA promulgated a final rule governing disposal of coal combustion 
residuals (“coal residuals”) pursuant to the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (“RCRA”) which allowed states to regulate coal residuals in 
the interim while EPA considered regulating disposal on the federal level 
and set minimum criteria for disposing of coal residuals. Environmental 
Groups and Industry Groups both petitioned to review the final rule. The 
D.C. Circuit allowed EPA’s motion to voluntarily remand some provisions 
of the final rule for reconsideration but denied remand on all provisions 
currently in dispute by the parties. Environmental Groups challenged 
provisions allowing (1) unlined surface impoundments (“USIs”) to continue 
operation until they caused ground water contamination, (2) “clay-lined” 
surface impoundments to be classified as “lined” and therefore treated the 
same as impoundments lined with a geomembrane, and (3) the exemption 
of inactive impoundments at inactive facilities (“legacy ponds”) from 
current regulations for similar inactive impoundments. The court vacated all 
three provisions as arbitrary and capricious because (1) both the responsive 
approach of detecting leaks in USIs and EPA’s regulation of “clay-lined” 
impoundments did not address and respond to the identified health and 
environmental harms and was thus contrary to the requirements of RCRA, 
and (2) EPA’s decision to exempt legacy ponds due to difficulties of 
identifying responsible parties disregarded the substantial risk posed by 
legacy ponds and was contradicted by the record. The court rejected the 
Industry Group’s challenges to the final rule, holding that EPA (1) had the 
authority to regulate inactive impoundments since RCRA confers EPA 
authority over “open dumps”, (2) provided adequate notice to parties on 
location requirements for existing impoundments, (3) regulations for 
seismic impact zones were not arbitrary and capricious, and (4) did not 
have to consider costs when providing alternatives for sites having to close 
due to the final rule.  
 
N.D. Alabama 
Black Warrior Riverkeeper Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 2:17-cv-
00439-LSC, 2018 WL 3869983 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 14, 2018).  
 
Environmental advocates (“Advocates”) moved for summary judgment 
against Corps, and Corps cross motioned for the same. Company requested 
a jurisdictional determination from Corps so that it may expand its mining 
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operations. Corps accepted Company’s project proposal and monitored the 
progress to ensure Company complied with the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) 
and the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”). However, Corps did 
not require Company to produce an environmental impact statement 
(“EIS”), nor did Corps investigate whether or not wildlife would be harmed 
from the expansion, concluding that the mining site was too distant from 
areas with known endangered species. Advocates claim that Corps 
conducted its duties in an “arbitrary and capricious” manner, violating the 
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) in relation to the Endangered 
Species Act (“ESA”), CWA, and NEPA. For such a claim, the court may 
only set aside an agency’s action if it was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law”; if the action was 
rational, the court may not set aside the action. If the following criteria 
exists, an agency’s decision not to require an EIS is likely not arbitrary: (1) 
the agency correctly identified the environmental concern; (2) the agency 
considered the concern in a critical light; (3) the agency found that no 
significant impact is made and can make a convincing case for that finding; 
(4) if there is a significant impact, the agency found that safeguards 
sufficiently reduce the impact. The court found for Corps, stating that 
Advocates did not file their ESA claim timely, that Corps followed proper 
procedure in determining that the project did not need an EIS, and that 
Corps correctly assessed the potential harm of the project. 
 
D. Colorado 
High Country Conservation Advocates v. U.S. Forest Serv., 2018 WL 
3804099 (D. Colo. Aug. 10, 2018). 
 
Organization challenged Agency’s decision to approve an exception to the 
Colorado Roadless Rule (“CRR”). The exception allowed for road 
construction on previously protected land. Organization brought action 
under the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) and the 
Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”). The challenge was brought in 
conjunction with a dispute over proposed coal exploration and mining 
activities. The court affirmed the Agency’s decision. The court explained 
that the Agency considered alternatives, and disclosed and considered the 
baseline environmental data, as required by NEPA. Further, the court noted 
that though NEPA imposes procedural requirements on agencies, it does 
not determine the substantial conclusion reached by agencies.  
 
This case has since been appealed to the Tenth Circuit, but there is no 
decision from the higher court as of publication 
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Rocky Mountain Peace & Justice Ctr. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. 18-
CV-01017-PAB, 2018 WL 3772864 (D. Colo. Aug. 9, 2018).  
 
Organization appealed the administrative decisions of the Fish and Wildlife 
Service (“FWS”) pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”), 
National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), and the Endangered Species 
Act (“ESA”). Organization sought preliminary injunctive relief against the 
construction of rerouted trails and the allowance of public access to trails at 
the Rocky Flats National Wildlife Refuge. The Refuge was located near a 
decommissioned nuclear processing facility. Organization claimed that 
FWS’s administrative decisions would pose irreparable harm to 
Organization members. Particularly, Organization argued that the 
disturbance of the soil would likely result in harm to Organization 
members. The court denied Organization’s motion for injunctive relief 
holding that they had failed to meet the burden of proof. The court 
explained that the Organization was burdened to at least show that there 
was no standard safe level of exposure to plutonium and that the 
administrative action may exasperate the risk of exposure.  
 
M.D. Florida 
Sierra Club, Inc. v. St. John’s River Water Mgmt. Dist., 320 F.Supp.3d 
1298 (M.D. Fla. 2018). 
 
Environmental advocates (“Advocates”) brought suit against the water 
management district (“District”) and Corps, alleging that permitting the 
development of part of an embankment violated the Clean Water Act 
(“CWA”), the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), and the National 
Environmental Protection Act (“NEPA”). As long as an agency’s actions 
were rational and followed an established procedure, those actions will not 
be considered arbitrary under APA standards. The court may not review the 
agency’s actions with the benefit of hindsight; such determinations must be 
made in light of the circumstances in existence at the time of the action or 
decision. District and Corps followed established procedures regarding the 
permission to develop and reduce the size of the bank; CWA even outlines 
the process for granting such permission. State agencies, like District, have 
the ability under CWA to regulate their own waters. The court granted 
District’s motion for summary judgment because Advocates failed to show 
that permitting development of the bank and allowing a reduction of the 
bank’s size violated CWA, or APA and NEPA subsequently. 
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W. Watersheds Project v. Zinke, No.: 1:18-cv-00187-REB, 2018 WL 
4550396 (D. Idaho Sept. 21, 2018). 
 
Organization brought action against BLM, challenging BLM’s instruction 
memorandum. The court found that Organization had standing because 
members of Organization showed that they “frequently and extensively 
utilize the areas where oil and gas leases overlap with sage-grouse habitats 
and populations.” Because Organization showed personal stake in the 
controversy, it had properly established standing. Further, Organization’s 
request for injunctive relief was found to be ripe because BLM’s actions 
cause specific hardships to Organization. The court also found that 
Organization was likely to succeed on the merits of their claim. BLM’s 
actions were found to be subject to judicial scrutiny, and under various 
required statutes, the court found Organization’s claims likely to prevail. 
The court also found that if they did not grant the injunction, Organization 
was likely to suffer irreparable harm due to BLM’s incomplete observance 
of environmental laws. Finally, the court found that the balances of 
hardships to BLM in relation to a preliminary injunction are not supported 
in denouement of third quarter oil and gas sales. All subsequent quarters 
and sales, however, were not found to be unduly burdened. 
 
D. Montana 
Indigenous Envtl. Network v. United States Dep’t of State, 317 F.Supp.3d 
1118 (D. Mont. 2018). 
 
Environmental organizations (“Advocates”) filed a motion for summary 
judgment against the State Department (“Department”). Advocates alleged 
that when Department published its record of decision and national interest 
determination, and issued a Presidential permit allowing the construction of 
a cross-border pipeline, it violated the Administrative Procedure Act 
(“APA”), National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), and Endangered 
Species Act (“ESA”). APA standards governed the review of Advocates’ 
claims, requiring that a rational connection must exist between the facts 
found and the conclusions made in support of Department’s actions. If the 
action is found to be arbitrary or an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with the law, the court may set aside the action. The court found 
that Department did violate NEPA because Department was required to 
issue a supplemental environmental impact statement when it changed the 
originally approved route of the pipeline. Agencies still have an obligation 
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to prepare supplemental environmental impact statements where permitting 
decisions have already been made, but the project is not yet complete. 
 
Native Ecosystems Council v. Marten, CV 18-87-M-DLC, 2018 WL 
3831339 (D. Mont. Aug. 13, 2018). 
 
Environmental advocates (“Advocates”) brought suit against Forester, 
alleging that the failure to consult an amended forestation plan that may 
affect an endangered species violated the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”). 
If an agency’s actions could have an effect, positive or negative, on an 
endangered species or critical habitat, the agency must conduct a 
consultation under ESA – this triggering threshold is very low, as Congress 
has given first priority to the protection of listed species and habitats. The 
court granted Advocates motion for preliminary injunction, finding that the 
current forestation plan could have an adverse effect on an endangered 




Hobart Corp. v. Dayton Power & Light Co., No. 3:13-cv-115, 2018 WL 
3978094 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 20, 2018).  
 
Three companies (“Companies”) voluntarily entered into a settlement 
agreement with the EPA and incurred cleanup costs of a contaminated site 
containing hazardous waste. Companies later filed suit against other 
allegedly responsible companies, Asphalt Company and Power and Light 
Company (“P&L”), to recover costs Companies incurred from the cleanup 
pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation 
and Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”). Both Asphalt Company and P&L 
filed counterclaims against Companies asserting that they incurred response 
costs of their own after release of hazardous substances from the cleanup 
site. Companies moved to dismiss these counterclaims for failure to state a 
claim. Under CERCLA, private parties may recover cleanup costs either 
under section 107 or section 113. Under section 107, a private party may 
recover costs they incurred voluntarily, and under section 113, parties who 
are themselves liable under CERCLA may ask for compensation from other 
responsible parties in order to distribute the cost of cleanup equitably. 
Under the settlement agreement between Companies and the EPA, 
Companies were protected from liability arising under section 113. Noting 
precedent holding that remedies from either section are mutually exclusive, 
the court held that since Asphalt Company and P&L were eligible for relief 
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under section 113, they are thus not eligible for relief under section 107 
even if such an outcome resulted in other companies shouldering a 
disproportionate cost of cleanup.  However, the court did allow for Asphalt 
Company to recover cost of identifying other potentially responsible parties 
since those costs fell outside the scope of the protections contained in the 
settlement agreement between Companies and the EPA. Therefore, the 
court sustained in part and overruled in part Companies’ motion to dismiss.  
 
W.D. Virginia 
Drummond Coal Sales, Inc. v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., No. 7:16cv00489, 2018 
WL 4008993 (W.D. Va. Aug. 22, 2018). 
 
Coal Producer entered into an agreement with Railroad to supply certain 
minimum levels of coal to be transported by Railroad and sold at 23 power 
plants. The contract stipulated that if Coal Producer did not meet its 
minimum amount of coal, it must pay heavy fees to Railroad. It was 
undisputed that these minimum volumes were not met and that Coal 
Producer had paid millions of dollars in fees. At trial, Coal Producer 
brought six claims: (1) to be excused from performance; (2) unjust 
enrichment; (3) force majeure; (4) frustration of purpose; (5) 
impracticability; or (6) rescission of the contract. First, the court held that a 
factual question precluded summary judgment for excused performance 
since it was alleged that Railroad entered into subsequent contracts with the 
power plants, limiting their ability to buy from Coal Producer, which may 
have constituted a breach of the duty of good faith, an issue to be decided 
by the factfinder. However, because unjust enrichment was premised upon 
the breach of contract in the first count, the claim for unjust enrichment 
failed as a matter of law. Third, the court found that none of the 
circumstances constituting a force majeure as defined in the contract had 
occurred. Next, the court determined that Coal Producer failed to establish 
that its ability to carry out the contract was commercially impracticable or 
that the contract’s purpose had been frustrated. Finally, the court 
determined that the final count, modification of the contract, was also based 
on the findings of the jury on the issue of breach of contract. Thus, 
summary judgment on this issue would be inappropriate.  
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Seattle Times Co. v. LeatherCare, Inc., C15-1901 TSZ, 2018 WL 3873562 
(W.D. Wash. Aug. 15, 2018). 
 
Previous property owner (“Former”) brought suit against former tenant 
(“Tenant”) for contaminating the property with hydrocarbons and 
petroleum products in the course of Tenant’s dry-cleaning business, 
violating the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (“CERCLA”), as well as Washington’s Model Toxics Control 
Act (“MTCA”). Tenant then brought suit against current property owner 
(“Current”). Current countered and crossclaimed against Tenant and 
Former. After Current bought the property, it had to excavate over 100,000 
tons of contaminated soil and install injection wells to address the 
contaminated ground water. The court found that the president of Tenant 
was not personally liable for Current’s clean-up costs because he was not an 
“operator” under CERCLA and applicable state law; however, Tenant as a 
corporation was liable for seventy percent of Current’s soil transportation 
and disposal costs while Former was liable for the remaining thirty percent. 
Under the orphan share doctrine, Former, Tenant, and Current almost 
evenly split liability for Current’s groundwater treatment and regulatory 
review costs, with Current assuming slightly more liability than the others. 
The orphan share doctrine governs that when liability for environmental 
clean-up efforts fall on an insolvent or otherwise unavailable entity, the 
liability will be equitably apportioned amongst the available, responsible 
parties. Furthermore, because the parent company of Former obtained 
Former as a sole shareholder rather than a successor company, the corporate 
veil did not need to be pierced and parent company cannot assume Former’s 
liability for Current’s clean-up costs under CERCLA. 
 
This case has since been appealed, but there is no decision from the higher 





Forest Pres. Soc’y v. Dep’t of Forestry & Fire Prot., No. A148182, 2018 
WL 4091010 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2018).   
 
Society petitioned a writ of mandate against Department for allegedly 
failing to properly assess a timber harvesting plan’s (“the Plan”) negative 
environmental impacts before granting approval. The trial court denied the 
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petition, and Society appealed to the California Court of Appeal. The court 
reviewed the case de novo, but with deference to Department decisions and 
Society bearing the burden of proving such decisions erroneous. The court 
held that Department did not abuse its discretion, or violate the California 
Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”), in choosing the California Air 
Resources Board’s Scoping Plan to measure greenhouse gas emissions, 
because there was no requirement to use the 2020 and 2050 emission 
reduction targets as the goal. Department was also able to aptly explain how 
the Scoping Plan would address the goals of reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions. The court held that the disagreement over which plan would 
better advance the goals of reducing emissions, while maintaining the 
forests, was not enough to merit a rejection of Department’s actions. The 
court rejected Society’s claims that the Plan was required to have 
quantitative data supporting the “carbon sequestration projections”, because 
the CEQA does not have any such requirement. The court rejected 
Society’s claims that Department’s analysis of the Plan’s cumulative 
greenhouse gas effects was flawed, because the available information and 
the expected carbon sequestration rate under the Scoping Plan allowed 
Department to make a reasonable conclusion that the Plan’s “greenhouse 
gas emissions will not significantly impact climate change.” The court 
rejected claim of improper consideration of short-term carbon conditions, 
because documents in the record plainly showed otherwise. The court held 
the Plan’s mitigation measures were appropriate and legally enforceable, 
because the Plan included a monitoring program by Department and a 
permit-seeking requirement for any deviations from the Plan. The court 
affirmed the lower court decision. 
 
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules 
should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.  
 
San Franciscans for Livable Neighborhoods v. City & Cty. of San 
Francisco, 236 Cal.Rptr.3d 893 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018).  
 
San Francisco neighborhood association (“Association”) filed suit against 
City alleging that City’s environmental impact report (“EIR”) did not 
comply with the requirements of the California Environmental Quality Act 
(“CEQA") when City developed its 2009 plan for housing (“Housing 
Element”). The lower court ruled that City’s EIR was sufficient except for 
the analysis of project alternatives and possible mitigation measures. 
Association appealed. The appellate court upheld all aspects of the EIR. 
First, the court determined that the Housing Element EIR properly used 
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future conditions of the city in calculating the environmental impacts of the 
project since using current baseline conditions of the city would be 
misleading given the city’s high level of growth. Second, the court held that 
the EIR’s environmental impact analysis concluding that there would no 
substantial impact on land use and aesthetics, traffic, and water were 
adequate because: (1) the Housing element did not change any current land 
use allowances or building restrictions; (2) the EIR noted potential traffic 
increases but justified a low impact on traffic by encouraging and 
identifying policy measures that would mitigate these effects; and (3) the 
water use and source analysis sufficiently provided notice of possible 
consequences of the proposed plan on water supply when it relied on a 
water demand study. Lastly, the court held that Association had not met its 
burden in proving the rage of alternatives provided and considered by 
City’s EIR was manifestly unreasonable.  
 
Sierra Club v. Cty. of Kern, No. F071133, 2018 WL 3360567 (Cal. Ct. 
App. July 10, 2018). 
 
Club sued County over County’s specific plans for regional development, 
alleging that the attached environmental impact report (“EIR”) violated the 
California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”) by (1) improperly 
examining long-term impacts of greenhouse gas emissions, (2) ineffectively 
mitigating environmental impacts, (3) ineffectively mitigating impacts on 
agricultural resources, and (4) “deferring the formulation mitigation 
measures for air quality impacts.” The lower court rejected Club’s petition 
for writ of mandate and claims, so Club appealed. This court reviewed 
under an abuse of discretion standard. The court held that County 
established its threshold of significance in relation to greenhouse gases 
properly, because County examined other agencies’ thresholds of 
significance, were reasonable at the time of creation, and did not conflict 
with judicial precedent. County adequately considered the 2050 greenhouse 
gas emission reduction target, but chose not to use it. The court held that 
County had properly analyzed long term environmental affects, because the 
EIR was made to evolve with new scientific knowledge and environmental 
legislature. The court rejected Club’s assertions of gas emission exceptions 
for small projects, because the EIR language was not suitable to such an 
interpretation. The court rejected the assertion that County took position of 
powerlessness in relation to land use mitigation and the assertion that 
County would not consider transportation mitigation measures, because 
language in the Specific Plan and the EIR discussed both of these issues. 
The court held that County’s 1:1 ratio of agricultural conservation was 
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proper, because such mitigation is not required as a matter of law and Club 
fails to identify a defect in the scheme. The court held that the EIR 
language requiring mitigation of negative air quality impacts “where 
feasible” failed as an objective standard, and the court held that this failure 
violated the CEQA. The court thus reversed and remanded the case. 
 
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules 
should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.  
 
SWVP-GTIS MR, LLC v. Pinal Cty., No. 1 CA-TX 16-0017, 2018 WL 
3853598 (Ariz. Ct. App. Aug. 14, 2018). 
  
Company leased property to Lessee for ranching purposes. Lessee made 
improvements on the land. Company applied to County for agricultural 
property tax classification, but County denied the application. Company 
sued County for the denied classification, but County motioned to 
significantly limit Company’s evidence showing that the land is used for 
agricultural purposes. The lower court found for County, as Company could 
not meet its burden. Company appealed. To be classified as agricultural, 
grazing property must have “a minimum carrying capacity of forty animal 
units and contain[ ] an economic feasible number of animal units,” and the 
property must show “a reasonable expectation of operating profit, exclusive 
of land cost, from the agricultural use of the property.” The legal 
presumption is that County correctly denied the classification request, 
though it may be overcome with a factual showing. Because of County’s 
motion, Company could not produce evidence in regard to grazing lands or 
the water use on the property. The Arizona Court of Appeals held that the 
lower court erred in precluding Company’s evidence and remanded for a 
new trial. 
 
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules 
should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.  
 
Massachusetts 
Miramar Park Ass’n, Inc. v. Town of Dennis, 105 N.E.3d 241 (Mass. 2018). 
 
Association sued Town, in 2014, under the theory that Town violated state 
environmental rules by placing materials dredged from a tidal river mouth 
on a publicly-owned beach, rather than Association’s privately-owned 
beach to fight sediment loss. The lower court granted summary judgment to 
the Association, because Town’s 1990 expansion of the jetty activated 
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responsibilities under 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 10.27 (2014) and denied 
Town’s motion for summary judgment. The lower court even issued an 
injunction requiring Town to dredge the river on occasion and deposit the 
material on Association’s beach. Town appealed to the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts. The Court discussed the interplay of multiple state 
statutes, which allowed citizens to bring complaints for environmental 
damage, promulgation of wetland protection by local authorities, and 
regulations of water quality that permitted Association to even bring this 
suit against Town. The Court reviewed the grant of summary judgment de 
novo. The Court held that the actual disputed 2014 dredging did not create 
an environmental harm. Additionally, the Court rejected the idea that the 
1990 extension of the jetty by Town created ongoing obligations to renew 
Association’s beach, because Association failed to prove that the jetty 
expansion was made under “an order of conditions that was issued by the 
conservation commission” that would actually create obligations under the 
Massachusetts statute. This order is a necessary element to allowing such 
environmental modifications, and only where an order of conditions was 
attached that created an obligation to renew Association’s beach could such 
an obligation exist. The Court held that no such order of conditions existed. 
The Court concluded that Association had thus failed to prove 
environmental harm from the dredging and no obligation form the jetty 
expansion. The Court reversed the lower decision, vacated the injunction, 
and granted summary judgment to Town.   
 
Michigan 
Howard v. Glenn Haven Shores Ass’n, No. 340174, 2018 WL 3594782 
(Mich. Ct. App. July 26, 2018). 
 
Landowners brought suit against Association for damages to properties 
incurred due to excessive erosion. Landowners owned three plots of land, 
adjacent to Lake Michigan, located in the subdivision managed by 
Association. Landowners claimed that the excessive runoff was due to 
construction activities performed by Association and that Association owed 
them a duty to take affirmative steps to lessen or stop surface water runoff 
onto their property.  The trial court granted Association's motion for 
summary judgment, ruling that Association owed Landowners no duty to 
affirmatively prevent erosion and runoff. Landowners appealed. The Court 
of Appeals of Michigan affirmed the trial court's finding, ruling that 
Association, as the dominant estate owner, owed no duty to take affirmative 
action. The court did find, however, that dominant estate owners do have a 
duty to refrain from negligent conduct that would increase the natural flow 
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of surface water so as to cause more erosion than would otherwise occur 
naturally.  The court found that Landowners had not made a pleading 
sufficient to support their claim and affirmed the trial court's summary 
judgment ruling. 
 
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules 
should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.  
 
Minnesota 
Minnesota Sands, LLC v. Cty. of Winona, 917 N.W.2d 775 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2018). 
 
Mineral Company brought suit against County alleging that its zoning 
ordinance banning companies from industrial mineral operations within 
County was unconstitutional under both the Minnesota and United States 
constitutions. Specifically, Company claimed that the zoning ordinance 
violated the dormant Commerce Clause and that the ordinance was a 
regulatory taking of the Company’s property interest. However, the court 
found that the provision in question was even-handed in its application, 
burdened both in-state and out-of-state interests, and was not facially 
discriminatory. Therefore, the provision did not violate the dormant 
Commerce Clause. Further, the court was not persuaded by Company’s 
argument that the ordinance constituted a regulatory taking of its property 
interest in the minerals in County. More precisely, the court held that 
Company failed to fulfill a condition precedent necessary for its interest to 
accrue. Thus, they were not compensable property interests. As such, the 
court affirmed the previous summary judgment in favor of County.  
 
New Jersey 
State v. Quaker Valley Farms, LLC, 192 A.3d 996 (N.J. 2018).  
 
New Jersey’s State Agriculture Development Committee (“SADC”), 
seeking to enforce restrictions placed on the use of farmland by the 
Agriculture Retention and Development Act (“ARDA”) and a deed of 
easement’s command to conserve soil, brought action against a farmland 
Owner to stop disruption of prime quality soil. The SADC initiated an 
investigation of Owner, which showed that Owner excavated and leveled 
twenty acres of the farm previously used for the production of crops to erect 
hoop houses where flowers can be grown. The trial court granted summary 
judgement in favor of SADC, halting Owner’s project and ordering the 
remediation of the despoiled land. The appellate court reversed finding “the 
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imperative of soil conservation had to be reconciled with the permissible 
construction of buildings for agricultural purposes under both the deed of 
easement and the ARDA.” The case then went before the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey. The Court held that the appellate court erred in its grant of 
summary judgement for the SADC. Based on the evidence, it was 
determined that Owner permanently damaged soil in violation of the ARDA 
and the existing SADC regulation. While Owner had the right to erect hoop 
houses in furtherance of his business, Owner did not have the authority to 
permanently damage a “wide swath of premier quality soil.” This court 
acknowledged that SADC had yet to promulgate guidelines that would 
permit farmland owners to make informed decisions about permissible 
agricultural uses of land under the ARDA and similar deeds of easement. 
However, even under the existing law and present deed, “any reasonable 
person should have known that despoiling so much prime quality soil was 
an unauthorized activity.” The Court remanded to the trial court to continue 
with the prior ordered remediation plan. 
 
Pennsylvania 
Del. Riverkeeper Network v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., No. 1571 C.D. 2017, 
2018 WL 3637059 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Aug. 1, 2018).  
 
Organization sought judicial review of the Pennsylvania Environmental 
Hearing Board’s (“EHB”) decision to deny Organization’s petition to 
challenge the Department of Environmental Protection’s approval of a 
natural gas pipeline project. The court opined that their review of the 
decision of the EHB could only extend to a determination of whether there 
had been errors of law or constitutional violations and whether or not there 
was substantial evidence to support the decision. The court found that EHB 
did not abuse its discretion. The court reasoned that because Organization 
failed to show “good cause” to permit the filing of the petition, EHB’s 
decision was appropriate.   
 
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules 
should be consulted before citing the case as precedent. 
 
EQT Prod. Co. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 193 A.3d 1137 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2018). 
 
The reviewing court evaluated Board’s assessment of a civil penalty against 
Company for the infiltration of wastewater into groundwater. The resulting 
significant and undisputed pollution from the infiltration allowed for a fine 
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of up to $10,000 per day, per violation under the terms of the Clean Streams 
Law (“CSL”). Company disputed the amount of the penalty determined by 
Board (the “maximum”), and the appellate review of the Board’s decision 
was limited by administrative reviews, which limits review to questions of 
law or clear error of fact. The court evaluated the Board’s decision based on 
a record that supported Board’s contentions. The dispute, held as an 
administrative hearing, took place over ten days and developed a 
considerable record of fact, analysis, and conclusions of law. The ample 
record allowed the court to point to multiple sources in favor of Board’s 
assessment. Company challenged the penalty in its length of time 
determination and willfulness enhancer. The Board’s determination of the 
violation time relied on expert testimony that used scientific methods to 
testify with a “reasonable degree of scientific certainty” that the pollution 
took place as described. As it determined the testimony to be reasonable, 
scientific, and contrary to Company’s allegation, the reviewing court 
upheld the Board’s determination. The Board also relied on multiple 
circumstances and evidentiary proofs to come to the conclusion that 
Company acted willfully in failing to appropriately respond to the pollution. 
The totality of the circumstances that Board considered, as well as specific 
evidences of Company apparently ignoring significant notices of potential 
problems, satisfied the reviewing court that Board’s determinations were 
not arbitrary or capricious. The court also noted that there was no legal 
error in Board’s calculations, as that court’s rulings to the contrary had been 
overturned themselves by the state Supreme Court. Therefore, the court 
upheld Board’s determination. 
 
Flick v. Salerno, No. 1966 EDA 2016 & No. 551 EDA 2017, 2018 WL 
4339662 (Pa. Super. Ct. Sept. 11, 2018). 
 
Owner-1 sought indemnification for penalties and costs associated with 
groundwater pollution from Owner-2 and Engineer. Owner-2 was the prior 
owner of the afflicted property, and alleged no knowledge of any pollution 
or waste during the sale. Furthermore, Owner-1 had directed an 
environmental inspection by Engineer of the property prior to completing 
the sale. Years after the sale, a neighboring Company’s tests revealed 
pollutant levels exceeding the state standards. Following the settlement of 
litigation between Owner-1 and Company, in which Owner-1 admitted 
responsibility and damages for the pollutants, Owner-1 filed the 
indemnification action. The trial court denied the action as barred by the 
statute of limitations. The appellate court affirmed, noting that Owner-1 
initially filed suit against Owner-2 long after a breach of contract claim 
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would be timely. Even if the allegation was accurate, the court noted: (1) 
Owner-1 acknowledged notice of a potential breach in 2003; (2) the statute 
of limitations would run for four years; and (3) that the suit was filed in 
2014. The court acknowledged that a pure indemnification claim may not 
mature until judgment was finally determined in prior litigation, but noted 
that the present indemnification claim, even if interpreted most favorably to 
Owner-1, matured upon discovery of the damages that were arguably 
negligently caused by a third-party, here Owner-2. Therefore, the same 
analysis that barred the breach of contract claim related to indemnification, 
in that the discovery of pollutants acted as notice of potential legal claims, 
and the limitations of six years on indemnification claims had run prior to 
filing. Lastly, the court affirmed fee shifting in favor of Owner-2 because 
the claim properly came under the purview of the Clean Streams Law 
which allows for fee shifting at the trial court’s discretion.    
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